THE NATION

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

Nixon or Kennedy?

THE PEOPLE HAVE DECIDED

William G. Carleton

Featherbedding vs. Automation

The Issue That Must Be Faced

William Glazier

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LETTERS

Eichmann's Fate

Dear Sirs: A Jew who has lost many of his close relatives in the concentration camps in Germany might be forgiven a feeling of violent resentment against Stuart Palmer's calm proposal ["Eichmann and Ourselves," Aug. 20] to spare Eichmann's life in order to use him for an unemotional and objective sociological study. . . . But, strangely enough, I find myself able to agree with him. At the same time I have strong misgivings about the ability and desire of modern sociologists to handle such a study effectively.

Professor Palmer, a teacher of sociology, does not seem to distinguish clearly between the ordinary murderer, who destroys one or several lives with his own hands, and the genocidal killer — perhaps himself unable to bear the sight of blood — who is nevertheless capable of organizing hundreds of thousands of people and vast amounts of equipment into an exquisitely working machine for the most efficient slaughter of millions. For this reason, Mr. Palmer can connect a massive hunt for social forces with the meager findings that Eichmann had a head injury, a dominating mother and a passive father. This confusion probably arises out of the failure to recognize the great qualitative difference that exists between the murderer who is an aberration, an abnormal or sick individual in a fairly healthy society, and the one who is a fairly healthy member, if that is possible, of a very sick society. . . .

In spite of these doubts, however, I feel that Professor Palmer's study should be made. Out of it may come the realization that cremating millions in concentration-camp ovens with ordinary fuel cannot be morally lower than disintegrating them in their homes with nuclear fuel. It may even reveal to many scientists now working on various means of mass slaughter the strong component of Eichmannism in their characters. . . . It may even sensitize us to the blood content of wages, dividends and profits made out of preparation for war.

BENJAMIN DE LEON

Newark, N.J.

Dear Sirs: I imagine you will be receiving quite a few letters from readers who believe that Stuart Palmer is really S. J. Perelman doing a take-off on women's magazine social psychologists ("Like it or not, it may be well to keep in mind that Eichmann was once a two-year-old child who played in the sand as my child is doing now"), and by other readers who concede that there may be a Stuart Palmer and are distressed by his Teacher's College callousness ("Terrible as Eichmann's crimes were, if one is going to insist on being negatively emotional about him . . ."). I have no inside information, but if there is a Stuart Palmer, I hope everybody will keep in mind that he was once a two-year-old child playing in the sand, and that he *did* do this study of fifty-one murderers which found "head injuries, dominating mothers and passive fathers" to be relatively common among them. I am confident that Mr. Palmer will continue to produce such papers throughout his academic career and will go into retirement comfortable in the assurance that mankind's troubles stem from a lack of warmth during the first four years of life — and that the main thing is not to get excited. I wish somebody would do a study of sociologists.

WALTER GOODMAN

White Plains, N.Y.

Dear Sirs: Stuart Palmer points out one of our basic ills: general uwillingness and inability to think clearly about our situation and thus the inability to act to change it. Crises generally produce philosophers, who think and talk but don't do; and crusaders, who demonstrate on an emotional level — and stop there. The leftovers fall into the category of critics — those who prevent change and perpetuate the horrors they feel so indignant about by refusing their support to those whom they deem "maniacs," "beatniks" and "Commies." They usually come around, however, after the various changes have become commercialized or espoused by the government. They would not spare Chessman, who didn't even commit a murder; these same people cannot be expected to show understanding to a man guilty of six million murders.

Only if Mr. Palmer lived abnormally long could he witness humanity catching up, if it ever did, to his perceptions.

FAITH FRANKEL

Fords, N.J.

New Values Needed

Dear Sirs: "The Case of the Missing Purpose" [by Hans Meyerhoff, Aug. 20] calls for a solution. May I offer one?

Marx was wrong. Capitalism has never been wiped out in any industrial nation by the efforts of the proletariat. It is dying, none the less, because it has exhausted the ideas that gave it thrust at birth. The exhaustion shows in the lack of purpose that strikes any civilization that has worn out its animating ideas.

A new set of values beyond getting rich one by one (U.S.) or even getting rich all together (USSR) is what we need. I have a guess as to what it will be — but that is another matter.

DAVID MANDEL

Perth Amboy, N.J.

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NEW YORK, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1960
VOLUME 191, No. 7

THE NATION

EDITORIALS

Not the Season

"Sorry Session," commented *Newsweek* on the bobtail sitting of Congress just ended. *Newsweek* is not noted for crusading liberalism, and when its editors sound off in this fashion things must be pretty bad. It was indeed a sorry session, not only for the Democrats, but for the country and the great majority of voters. The session began on a high note of expectation in the Kennedy camp. Senator Kennedy was ready with a program of welfare measures which, though far from sweeping, did provide something for the more sorely beset sections of the population. He proposed to broaden the minimum-wage laws, pass school-construction legislation and — most appealing to elderly voters — to add "medicare" to the social-security system. Kennedy was so confident of success that he opened a new office next to Lyndon Johnson's and made it clear that he was personally in command. The Democrats stood to win votes whether President Eisenhower signed the bills or, as was more likely, vetoed them. But Congress passed nothing and left the voters in a fog. If they felt any displeasure, on whom could they vent it? On Representative Howard W. Smith, who in effect told Kennedy where he got off, and who has been a Congressman since Kennedy was thirteen years old? On the other Southern Bourbons from areas where limitations on voting and their local machines guarantee them life tenure? On the Vice President, when the Bourbons were doing his work for him?

It was a burlesque of the legislative process, of Democratic pretensions, and of the platform promises of both parties in some particulars. It showed how partisanship triumphs over all statesmanship and without the slightest danger to the perpetrators. Kennedy seemed to have an unbeatable measure in the plan to provide 120 days' hospitalization and other medical care for all aged sixty-eight or older on the federal security rolls, with a quarter of 1 per cent increase in social security taxes to foot the bill. He could not get it past the American Medical Association and the Southern bloc. In any but an election year, liberal Republican Senators like Jacob Javits and Margaret Chase Smith might have joined Clifford Case in voting against the coalition of Old Guard Republicans and Southern Democrats. Richard M. Nixon, fearful of Kennedy's getting some advantage out of the situation, argued privately against such concessions to statesmanship. Kennedy begged on the Senate floor for "at least five or six" Republican votes. Javits replied, "I am sorry, sir, but this is not the season for that." Finally there emerged a thoroughly emasculated version, providing for joint federal-state aid to the aged needy, i.e., near-paupers, most of whom would be admitted to hospital wards and state institutions without act of Congress. As for Kennedy's minimum wage bill, it was so beaten up that Kennedy refused to accept it, saying that it "would have constituted a deception to the millions of Americans who ask and deserve a much-needed improvement in their economic lot."

Newsweek's comment was not quite fair. Just before the session ended the House passed a measure to curb payola and deceptive practices in broadcasting, with lightened penalties previously specified by the Senate. Having done their duty, the members scattered to do the balance of their politicking at home.

Time Runs Out on the U.N.

In the full tide of its editorial wisdom, the New York *Daily News* suggested that the U.S. airmen who were brutally beaten by a mob of Congolese soldiers and civilians at the Stanleyville airport should have been armed, if only with sidearms. Since there were eight Americans (and two Canadians) and hundreds of Congolese, this would have insured the massacre of the entire Globemaster crew. As it was, their lives were saved by a handful of Ethiopian U.N. soldiers who were present, and whom the Congolese could distinguish from Belgians. In the present situation in the Congo, armed Americans are no solution, and armed Russians would probably fare no better. The fact that the rescuers were Africans may, however, point to a method of avoiding the chaos which threatens to engulf both the Congo and the efforts of the U.N. to restore order.

The basic trouble at Stanleyville was that the Globemaster landed at an airport controlled by the former *Force Publique* which, in its present state, is an armed mob rather than a disciplined military body. If the

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U.N. is to continue to function in the Congo, the airports must be controlled by it and not by Moise Tshombe, Patrice Lumumba, Albert Kalonji or any of the other newly arrived native statesmen, or others who may displace them in the immediate future. The Pan-African conference at Leopoldville urged Premier Lumumba to "maintain close cooperation with the United Nations." If Lumumba cannot be persuaded to allow his cooperation to take such tangible form as to permit detachments of Tunisians, Ghanians, Ethiopians, etc., to hold the airports, the situation will continue to deteriorate. Moreover, these detachments must be of sufficient strength, and well enough equipped, to suppress outbreaks and insure the safety of arriving and departing aircraft. Unless, by some happy but unforeseeable development, a measure of order should return to the Congo, the U.N. should sound out its African members on their willingness to provide paratroop forces to seize the airports, if necessary. If the Africans consent, the Russians might abstain in a Security Council vote; if they used the veto, the U.N. could act despite it as, under American pressure, it acted in Korea. The alternative may be U.N. withdrawal, followed by anarchy and starvation in the Congo.

The Moon Has Nothing for Them

Sadly, any meeting of scientists and politicians these days is likely to give rise to the most lugubrious forebodings. What new plan is afoot, we are inclined to wonder, for cooking the world out of existence instanter; what new noxious vapor is being readied to choke the oxygen from our lungs? How refreshing, then, to have followed the agenda of the recently concluded International Conference on Science in the Advancement of New States, where scientists from the West met with politicians of two score "have-not" countries to discuss not quicker deaths, but better living. The Weizmann Institute in Israel was sponsor and host, and the problems discussed had to do with the practical issues faced by the small new nations of the world: problems of agriculture, social services, government administration, public health, politics, economics. It was a unique conference in more ways than one. Not a single display was put up for the delegates—not even a graph, a chart, a table of statistics. All Israel was the showcase for the meeting. Did the delegates want to know about planting cotton? About de-salting sea water? About running a home for the aged or a hospital for chronic diseases? About collective agriculture? An hour's bus ride, in one direction or another, gave the delegates a view of ideas in action. Israel, as her Foreign Minister, Golda Meier, pointed out to an American TV audience recently, is fortunately situated to assist the new countries of Asia and Africa; her climate and soil are in many ways similar, and her stage of development is just sufficiently advanced to serve as a model, yet not too far advanced to overtax the resources of those who would learn from her.

Out of the conference emerged the "Rehovot Program," which envisions a series of "aided self-help" schemes involving technical and financial aid from older, wealthier countries to the new have-not states. And out of it, too, may emerge a permanent organization of political leaders and scientists to serve—in the words of Abba Eban, president of the Weizmann Institute and Israel's Minister of Education and Culture—"as a clearing house for . . . development schemes which can be applied to the evolving new states. We hope that delegates will . . . leave the conference determined to introduce into their economic and social systems something that will keep them in touch with the rest of the world, and that the modern scientific movement will regard Asia and Africa as its challenge and its arena."

Be it noted that the mysteries of nuclear fission played only a small, if intriguing, role in the discussions, and not a single politician asked a scientist for the shortest route to the moon.

How Do You Prefer to Die?

Recently the Army Chemical Corps staged a series of lectures and demonstrations for newsmen at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, aimed at removing prejudices against chemical and biological warfare — "CW" and "BW" in military terminology. Ten years ago, the spokesman admitted, there was a stigma attached to CW and BW, but, he added, "there has been a lot of progress in this field." As an example, he cited the nerve gas "GB" (for German Type B) which, according to the correspondent of the New York *Herald Tribune*, "induces death in a matter of minutes after the victim first suffers a chest tightening, salivation and perspiration, vomiting, pinpointing of the eyes, convulsions and finally death from a filling of the lungs with fluid. Despite these reactions, the Chemical Corps scientists said, death is painless."

To prove it, the Chemical Corps fired GB shells at goats and pigeons. Within a minute and a half, all the nearby goats and pigeons had "gone into a few quick convulsions, rolled over and died." One goat was masked "and appeared to thrive until, in his excitement, he tore the tube on his gas mask free, inhaled the GB and died in two minutes." The Army, it seems, gives a regular CBR (chemical, biological, radiological) Weapons Orientation Course weekly to selected visitors at Dugway. Colonel Joseph C. Prentice, the course director, says, "I'm an enthusiast over biological and chemical warfare. I think it's great stuff. It's more humane than anything else we've got." His enthusiasm will be shared by many, even if they are not among the selected visitors who can see for themselves.

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'VICTORY' at SAN JOSE . . *by Carleton Beals*

THE "VICTORY" of Christian Herter at the inter-American assemblage in Costa Rica may prove to be one of the costliest ever won by the United States. "A clear-cut indictment of the Castro Government of Cuba," crowed Herter. Foreign Minister Manuel Tello of Mexico, who made a brilliant defense of the right of the Cuban revolution to make its own mistakes and seek its own destiny, retorted that this was not the case. So did Venezuelan delegate, Ignacio Luis Arcaya, who previously had told the assemblage that his country rejected all coercive efforts "under the pretext of combatting communism."

Not one of the nineteen representatives from Latin America, not even those from semi-dictatorial Nicaragua, Salvador, Paraguay or Haiti, took much stock in Herter's unsubstantiated accusations. Several delegates did express vague fears about Cuba; several believed that the island should restrict its trade relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc; a number were concerned about Khrushchev's rocket-shaking. But, as one delegate pointed out, if the United States doesn't attack Cuba, there will be no rockets; and, as Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa asked pointedly: "Will the Latin American countries protect Cuba if we are attacked?"

Alfredo Vargas Fernández of Costa Rica, representing a Conservative government hostile to Cuba, stated: "The Cuban revolution is a phenomenon . . . that can be judged only by Cuba's own people." Even Raul Porras Barranchea of Peru, a country "crudely bribed" by a hastily improvised $50 million U.S. loan to initiate the O.A.S. meeting, said sharply: "Our people are subjected to inhuman conditions because of great corporations and monopolies." As he spoke, a bill was being introduced in the Peruvian Congress to expropriate U.S. oil holdings in that country.

The mighty voice of the people to the south rang in the ears of every worried delegate at San Jose. As the one from Chile spoke, 20,000 Chileans were being addressed in the public square of Santiago by Congressmen, labor leaders and others. Tens of thousands were massed in the Plaza Agraciado in Montevideo, Uruguay, with banners, "Don't touch Cuba!" The hundred most outstanding writers of Argentina wired the O.A.S. in the same vein. Telegrams from everywhere: 106 from civic organizations in Costa Rica itself; from Colombia, thirty-one Congressmen telegraphed: "The declarations of Eisenhower about the Monroe Doctrine [it was also flayed by several delegates on the floor] are an insult to the Latin American people."

From Mexico, where a month ago the heads of the Mexican parliament demanded national solidarity with Cuba, Isidro Fabela, the President's legal adviser, a distinguished statesman and author, sent word: "Our sister Cuba is in grave danger of losing her sovereignty, not because of any extra-continental attack, which is far-fetched, but on the pretext of . . . Communist intrusion into our hemisphere, in order to reduce her once more to a semi-sovereign state. . . . In view of the punitive airplanes, the oil embargo, the sugar boycott — how is Cuba to be blamed for seeking aid in other countries?"

As Roa walked out of the assemblage, he said, "We will make no step backward. . . . I am going back to my people and with me go all the peoples of Latin America." And every delegate knew it, except possibly Herter. Each such victory by the United States grows more costly and dangerous, whatever the immediate goals attained.

The sad thing is that in the end, in spite of brave speeches, all the chicks were tucked under the eagle's wing. If the delegates did not credit the charges of Herter about Cuba, neither would they consent to consider Roa's against the United States: the pushing of the trade credit embargo against Cuba; the cutting off of the usual four-month credit terms for purchases in the United States; the withdrawal of U.S. technicians; the refusal to modify the trade treaty; the oil embargo; the airplane flights from U.S. soil; the punitive unilateral sugar embargo (for which Brazil criticized the United States); the persistent anti-Cuban press campaign in the United States.

IN SHORT, the whole affair was a niggling business. But it did make fairly clear the basic attitude of the Latin American governments and of their peoples. Latin America did not give the United States what it wanted, but Herter was allowed to save face at the last moment. In the end, the delegates voted a bland resolution open to many possible interpretations, laying aside a straightforward one, upholding non-intervention and continental integrity, which Cuba would have signed. They first squawked a bit — even brought up the ghosts of Sandino and Guatemala — but they were anxious to prove that they were obedient. Cuba alone said it would continue to trade wherever it pleased, getting help from whomever would give it without strings.

Sorry also was the spectacle of the Latin American countries tucking themselves into the coccoon of hemisphere isolation under the aegis of the United States. But time is running out. Even the O.A.S., for all its brave talk about the sacred inter-American system, is merely a regional bloc authorized by the charter of the United Nations, a world organization. The sun will quickly hatch out the little cocoon. Latin America, for all its obedience, cannot much longer delegate its world responsibilities.

"But of course Africa will become free sooner than Latin America," one Latin American press representative said lugubriously.



Bohemia, Havana

Fidel Castro

CARLETON BEALS, author and journalist, has specialized in Latin American affairs for more than two decades.

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NIXON OR KENNEDY?

THE PEOPLE HAVE DECIDED . . *by William G. Carleton*

THE current Presidential campaign is to be no time for greatness; American voters are not in a heroic mood. The outcome will depend in part on bread-and-butter issues and even more on the personalities of the candidates and on the religious issue. At the grass roots, this is a dirty campaign.

Since the Republican National Convention, I have traveled through the South, the Middle West, and in certain sensitive areas of Pennsylvania and New York State, interviewing politicians and plain citizens and assiduously reading the local daily and even the county weekly newspapers. The tone of the campaign has already been set, and I believe the outcome, barring unforeseen events and circumstances, is already pretty well indicated.

In foreign affairs, run-of-the-mill Americans remain amazingly oblivious to the dangers of nuclear war and to the decisive importance of winning the confidence of the popular anti-colonial revolutions of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and now of Latin America. If the Eisenhower Administration should decide to "get tough" with Castro's Cuba, it would have the enthusiastic support of a majority of Americans. It is still widely believed that the West can somehow "liberate" the Soviet satellites, and both parties continue to encourage this notion in areas where Eastern European populations are large.

The foreign issue that really interests the American voter is "getting ahead" of the Soviet Union in the arms race. Nixon has the edge in foreign policy because he is regarded as "experienced" and able to "talk back" to the Russians. Recent American achievements in the satellite and missiles field are helping the Republicans, although in the grass roots there is a feeling that Eisenhower, still enormously popular, never really let the country down in the technological race, as the Democrats (and Rockefeller) claim.

DESPITE nearly two decades of world leadership, Americans are still intensely national-minded. "Fortress America" is far from a dead concept, and as intercontinental missiles become operational and reduce the need for American allies and bases abroad, the possibility of a new American isolationism is not to be completely dismissed.

Nor is McCarthyism dead. Indeed, the collapse of the Summit and the intensifying of the cold war have produced something like a revival of McCarthyism in some areas. Since the Paris breakdown, more and more syndicated columns and local editorials have been appearing in the small dailies and the rural weekly press to warn that the "real enemies" are the subversives and fifth-columnists inside America. At present, the crypto-Fascists are politically divided, the "Native American" and Protestant elements supporting Nixon and the right-wing Catholics supporting Kennedy. This division was an important factor in arresting the original McCarthyism, and America's pluralism will probably continue to be a formidable barrier to a renewed McCarthyism. Nevertheless, in spite of the defeat of the right wing in both the Democratic and Republican national conventions, it would be a mistake to write off a dangerous rightist movement as a future possibility — especially if cold-war tensions continue indefinitely.

There is acute agrarian discontent in the corn and wheat prairie states, and Secretary of Agriculture Benson has become the symbolic cause of that discontent. The Democratic argument in the farm states runs as follows: "The Republicans do not understand the socio-economic problems of the average farmer. The vast majority of farmers have very small acreages and produce only a small part of the agricultural product. No farm program of credit expansion, increased research, import quotas, land reclamation projects and collective bargaining can help these people. They need help in the form of direct government aid. Should we let a majority of the farm population live on the fringes of poverty while only 10 per cent of the farmers reap the benefits of the free-market system?" It is a telling and popular argument. However, by repudiating Benson, Nixon has taken off some of its edge. More important, in this election the Democrats have to expect that agrarian discontent will be offset to a considerable degree by the personality and religious issues, which have their greatest pull in the rural areas.

IN THE large industrial cities, the Democrats start, as usual, with a great advantage. Their record on labor and welfare measures is better than the Republican, and in this campaign they promise even more. Also, the Republicans are embarrassed by local Goldwater politicians who are supporting Nixon and at the same time giving expression to sentiments to the Right of the late Senator Taft. For instance, a few weeks ago, in a situation not unlike that in some other localities over the country, the followers of Richard Durant in Michigan came close to taking over the Wayne County (Detroit) Republican organization. Durant is the leading light of Republican Voters Associated, which has as its slogan "Back to McKinley" and claims that "President Eisenhower's brand of Republicanism has done nothing but make socialism respectable."

Nevertheless, even in the large cities, and although Kennedy is sure to get an even larger share of the Catholic vote than the Democratic nominee usually polls, all is not well with the Democrats. In social politics, Nixon is doing a good job of "me-tooing" the Democrats. At the same time he is getting support from those who fear inflation. Gal-

WILLIAM G. CARLETON is professor of Political Science at the University of Florida.

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braith economics, argued by the Democrats, which hold that a widening and intensifying of the public sector of the economy can increase the country's rate of economic growth and pay for expanded social services and defense measures without inflation, are too complex and still too novel and contrary to the conventional wisdom for the average voter to grasp.

In the cities, too, the personality and religious aspects will have their effect. I was surprised at the number of Jewish voters who said, "I guess I'll sit this one out." And the Negroes, while still predominantly Democratic, may not vote Democratic by as large a majority as usual. Republicans are stressing Nixon's civil-rights record and his membership in the NAACP; they are also gloating over the "surrender" of the Northern Democrats to the Southern Democrats on civil-rights legislation in the post-conventions session of Congress. Negro communities are being flooded with pamphlets quoting from Lyndon Johnson's speech at Blanco, Texas, on August 3, in which he told his fellow Texans that he would support the Democratic platform on civil rights during the campaign, but oppose parts of it when it gets to Congress. Johnson is quoted as saying: "I'll oppose that part of the program when it gets to Congress—not in the November election, but I'll put the opposition in the proper place."

WHILE IT hurts the Democratic campaign in the North, Johnson's candidacy does not seem to be holding the South for the national ticket. Nixon will probably carry Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, Louisiana and Texas in November, whether or not there is a slate of "neutral" or "independent" Presidential electors in any or all of them. Virginia, Tennessee, Florida and Texas went for Hoover in 1928 and for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. North Carolina went for Hoover in 1928. Louisiana went for Eisenhower in 1956. But in those states which have never gone Republican since Reconstruction — South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas — much will depend upon whether there is a slate of neutral or independent Presidential electors. Where there is no such slate, the odds are that the state will go to Kennedy. Where such a slate is filed in addition to the national Democratic slate, the Democratic vote would be divided and Nixon would have a chance. Where such a slate is a substitute for the national Democratic slate and the national Democrats are thus excluded from the ballot, the Republican vote would go up, but the States'-rights slate would probably carry. However, it already seems clear that not enough states will be carried by a neutral or States'-rights slate to deadlock the national election and throw it into the House of Representatives, which is the aim of the right-wing Southern Democrats. The real gainers from all this maneuvering will be the Republicans and not the Bourbon Democrats.

Why is the Democratic national ticket in danger in most of the South today? In part it is because of the South's militant Protestantism, its fear of a Catholic President. But there are other important reasons: the coolness of Southern liberals toward the Kennedy-Johnson ticket; the steady increase over the years in the number of "Presidential Republicans" in the South; the intense opposition of Southern conservatives to the "radical" civil-rights and social-welfare planks of the Democratic platform.

A British View



Time and Tide (London)

"And now, the junior featherweight championship."

IN ALL parts of the country, the two aspects of the campaign about which voters are talking most are the religion, personalities and backgrounds of the Presidential candidates and their wives.

Since the Smith-Hoover election of 1928, the number of Catholic voters has increased, but it is doubtful that the sentiment in the country against electing a Catholic President has declined much. In almost every community I visited, Democratic politicians said to me: "We are running scared. We know there is an anti-Catholic vote here, especially in the case of the Presidency. Just how big it is, we don't know. It is less organized and less open than it was in 1928."

The implications of Catholic strength in politics are discussed by some. The points raised usually involve birth control, government aid to parochial schools, censorship and the likelihood of a Catholic President's being able to work out a rapproche-

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ment with the Soviet Union. People who discuss the question in these intellectual terms are impressed by such things as the Eleanor Roosevelt-Cardinal Spellman controversy of a few years ago and Senator Kennedy's "softness" on the McCarthy censure. However, this thoughtful approach to the question will play only a small part in the voting.

THE REAL trouble for the Kennedy ticket stems from a primitive anti-Catholicism which goes back to the English folk experiences of the Reformation, Guy Fawkes, the Popish Plot, Titus Oates and the old Scotch-Irish traditions of Ulster. These folk attitudes are most evident in the rural Bible belts and in those communities, urban and non-urban, where the Anti-Saloon League and the Ku Klux Klan were strongest in the 1920s. In almost every city community I visited, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith reported a sharp rise in the number and circulation of anti-Catholic publications since the nomination of Kennedy. In Michigan, during the August primary, Catholic candidates in both parties were beset by secret but apparently concerted anti-Catholic whispering campaigns. Michigan newspapers reported that "bigotry is flooding the mails." Most of it is anonymous, and political parties and candidates are careful to keep clear of such literature. Recently *The Cleveland Press* reported a fairly typical attitude when it quoted an old woman as saying: "I don't care what the Democrats promise us old folks. I have to vote for Nixon to offset the Catholic vote. The Catholics would vote for Kennedy even if he were a yellow dog."

The dominantly Republican press is doing a most effective hatchet job of caricaturing Senator Kennedy and his wife. You will get this not so much from the ordinary news columns and editorials as from gossip columns on the woman's page, curbstone reporting of what Mr. and Mrs. Average America thinks, and the letters to the editor columns.

In the personal profiles of the candidates thus emerging, Nixon is seen as a typical American poor boy who has made good, an earnest Junior Chamber of Commerce type of American, a sincere Christian somewhere between a Quaker and a Methodist (he belongs to the Quaker sect but attends a Methodist church), a hard-working statesman, a man of monumental international experience. Recently, the artist for *The Buffalo Evening News* drew Nixon's picture in such a way as to make him resemble Lincoln. Thereafter, letters to the editor proclaimed that the writers, too, had noted the physical similarity, and one group, in dead seriousness, wrote to say that the night Nixon made his acceptance speech all of them, sitting around the TV set, noted how Lincoln's beard seemed miraculously to grow right out of Nixon's face!

On the other hand, Kennedy is "the youthful Massachusetts millionaire," born with a silver spoon in his mouth, typically Ivy League, who still buys his clothes in Mayfair. He is made to appear as a man of little political experience, as perpetually adolescent. With his "way-out smile" and his "bushy bop hairdo," he becomes "the bongo-beating pied-piper," the darling of the teenagers and the bobby-soxers. By way of Peter Lawford, his brother-in-law, Kennedy is linked to off-beat groups in Hollywood.

Here is a fairly typical comment about the two candidates from a special Washington correspondent of an influential Midwestern newspaper: "Both men present a picture of the competent, successful young executive — Mr. Kennedy with the smiling confidence of one who has had all the advantages; Mr. Nixon with the serious earnestness of one who hasn't."

CONTRASTS between Mrs. Nixon and Mrs. Kennedy are made to appear just as striking. Mrs. Nixon is the alert and energetic American girl who worked her way through college to become a housewife and mother, exemplifying all the middle-class virtues. We learn that she dislikes snooty small gatherings and prefers large and democratic ones. In some areas, there are already as many wearers of "I like Pat, too" buttons as there are of Nixon-Lodge buttons. Just once did I see a letter in a newspaper suggesting that Pat Nixon is as mechanical as her husband.

Mrs. Kennedy is being caricatured as mercilessly as the Senator. "Jackie" is the continuing young debutante who orders her frocks from Dior in Paris and who rides to hounds in the Orange County (Virginia) hunt. We are informed that she detests large gatherings and prefers little intimate parties with smart and sophisticated people "where the conversation is often in French or Italian." And then there is Jackie's "outlandish" bee-hive hairdo, which has already caused more comment among American women, Democratic and Republican, than any other "issue" of the campaign. All of the folk prejudices of Main Street and the Bible belts are being mobilized against Mrs. Kennedy. Typical is a quotation from an Ohio woman as reported in *The Cleveland Press*: "I'm against Kennedy because of his wife. She's not only Catholic, she's French. If she gets in, you'll never see so much wine in the White House."

Most objective political observers over the country rate Kennedy as a more magnetic personality than Nixon, as having positively charismatic qualities. But Nixon is better known than Kennedy, and it is held the Democratic nominee must move about the country and be seen by thousands every day from now until election if his true image is to emerge. It was felt that every day Kennedy remained in Washington he was losing votes to Nixon.

DEMOCRATIC politicians at the grass roots say that the decision of the Democratic Congressional leadership to bring Congress back into a post-conventions session was a lulu of a mistake. It not only hog-tied Mr. Kennedy to Washington, but in the midst of a Presidential election it advertised to the country the continuing North-South split in the Congressional party. A Presidential campaign is the one time when the Democratic Party usually escapes its Congressional situation and appears before the country as a national liberal party. This year, by insisting on the post-conventions session, the Democrats have projected their Con-

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gressional stalemate into the Presidential election period and underscored it.

Democratic leadership in most states is in unusually good shape. In California, the momentum of the Democratic victory of 1958 has not completely subsided and in his home state Nixon has made powerful factional enemies. In Oregon, Mrs. Neuberger, running for the Senate, is an effective politician in her own right and is the beneficiary of an enormous amount of sentimental good will for her late husband. In North Dakota, the Democrats are in the first flush of their recent Senatorial victory and feel that their amalgamation with the old Non-Partisan League has now become a reality. In Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota and Wisconsin, popular Democratic first-term governors are giving new life to their party. In Minnesota, veteran Senator Humphrey and veteran Governor Freeman are running for re-election. In Iowa, popular Governor Loveless is the party's candidate for Senator. In Kansas, Governor Docking, the best Democratic vote-getter in the state's history, is running for a third term. In Illinois, Senator Paul Douglas, who has always been stronger than his party, is up for re-election. In Indiana, the Democratic gubernatorial candidate is conceded to be running better than his Republican opponent. In Michigan, the Democrats are fortunate in having a gubernatorial candidate who promises to become as popular, in both cities and rural areas, as "Soapy" Williams, who declined to run this year. He is Lieutenant Governor John B. Swainson, thirty-five-year-old legless war veteran, who in every way is a "natural" in politics. In Ohio, Governor DiSalle is admittedly a controversial figure, but he has flair and drive. Nevertheless, if a national trend to Nixon should set in, these local leaders would in the main be powerless to check it, and some of them would become its November victims.

FEW Americans feel they are in a domestic crisis, for at present the country is fairly prosperous. Americans are not clear about the internal crisis. They rather think the lag in American defense has been exaggerated. The solutions offered by both parties to major issues seem to differ little. In spite of their tall talk about candor in time of crisis, both parties blur fundamentals in foreign policy. For instance, neither party tells the people that there can be no arms limitations without a rapprochement with Russia and that there can be no rapprochement without recognizing a virtual *status quo* in Eastern Europe. Neither party explains why the new and underdeveloped nations must take their first steps toward industrialization through initiative and financing by governments rather than by private enterprise.

With the public issues beclouded and many voters unable to discern meaningful differences between the parties, there is a tendency to emphasize the personality and religious differences between the candidates. In effect, a Horatio Alger type (including the Protestantism) has been pitted against a new type, a glamorous type suggestive of the Hollywood and TV celebrity. In this case, the one representing the new type is also a Catholic. It is a dramatic contrast, and it stirs many kinds of emotions —and prejudices. Even those observers who feel that the current behavior of American voters makes some sense under the circumstances deplore the petty, unfair and often malignant way the contest is being waged.

A ROAD TO PEACE . . *by Stanley Millet*

WE HAVE lived so long with the cold war that our very capacity to think about foreign policy has atrophied. Foreign policy is the major issue in the Presidential campaign, and everyone agrees that "fresh approaches and "bold new plans" are necessary. But of new policies themselves, or of fresh approaches that might be tested, we have heard scarcely a word. Our political thought is so tightly imprisoned in primitive anti-communism and narrow strategic concepts that the only serious debates over foreign policy which our public life has sustained in recent years have been concerned with military expenditures and with espionage. For the rest, we seem content with containment, collective security pacts and, as the current phrase has it, an adequate defense posture. That is to say, we accept the structure built for the cold war, the very structure which the events of the past spring and summer have called into question.

But these are paradoxical times. If the free world has been unable to break free of stale commitments, such has not been the case in the unfree East. The Khrushchev proposals to bring the cold war to an end through peaceful coexistence are just such an attempt at a radical reformulation of Russian foreign policy and of the principles upon which that policy has been based since the end of the Second World War. Within the context of Soviet political thought the Khrushchev proposals are heretical. By asserting that the Western "imperialists" no longer necessarily seek war and that it is possible for the Communist world to live in peace with them (dare an American politician make an equivalent assertion about the Communists?), Khrushchev has attacked sacred doctrine itself. That imperialism inevitably breeds war has, after all, been a cardinal principle of Leninism.

Paradox piles on paradox. It appears now that the Great Debate over foreign policy has taken place, not in the United States where speech is free, but in the totalitarian Com-

STANLEY MILLET teaches the social sciences at Briarcliff College and is currently working on a study of Soviet foreign policy.

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munist world. Such, it is evident, was the main business at the conference of Communist parties in Bucharest last June. And at that conference the debate apparently was resolved in favor of Khrushchev's policy of détente. [*See Paul Wohl's article on page 130, this issue.*—ED.]

Despite the intransigence of Soviet policy in recent weeks, the Khrushchev proposals are still said to stand. They are still as relevant to our predicament as they are to that of the Russians. The alternatives posed by them are the only alternatives which face both of us: either détente and an end to the cold war, or containment and deterrence with the inescapable risk that the whole system of pressure and counter-pressure may collapse at any moment. And if our own public discussions have failed to turn up reasonable terms for détente, we are left with only the Khrushchev proposals to consider.

DO THE Khrushchev proposals in fact point the way to an agreement? The five years which have passed since they were first offered have set his arguments in perspective. In sum, he has proposed that the cold war be ended on the basis of the existing *status quo*, and that future conflict between the two systems be carried on through peaceful means alone. The principal specific issues which must be settled to bring the cold war to an end are defined as disarmament, the German question and the related question of Berlin.

In his early speeches, Khrushchev invariably gave prominence to the German question. This, he said, was the "question of questions" between East and West. More recently, he has reversed the order, and called disarmament the crucial question. The reversal of importance is unfortunate, and it is equally unfortunate that all of the Western statesmen have joined him in thrusting this issue into prominence. It is unfortunate because disarmament is the least promising issue through which to seek a détente between East and West. Precisely because of the terrible character of modern military technology, negotiation over purely contentious questions must be avoided. And, until political conflict is eliminated, disarmament talks will yield only contention, never solutions. As long as fundamental political conflict persists, disarmament discussions necessarily take place on the basis of a search for military advantage, that is to say, on the basis of irreconcilable interests. Even when disarmament is considered in the abstract, it is clear that only the most insignificant agreements affect both parties with reasonable reciprocity, so different are their situations, geography, development, and the like. In practice, both Russia and the United States have been seriously interested only in such measures of disarmament as conserve their advantages as they see them, and the record amply justifies the recriminations made by both.

FOLLOWING the Khrushchev theses, then, we are left with only Germany and Berlin as issues through which a détente might be reached. But the Berlin question, however grave it has become in its own right, is only an appendage to the German question. Khrushchev deliberately raised it as a lever with which to force a more satisfactory solution to the German question. At the carefully prepared press conference from which the Berlin question was launched in November, 1958, the *Pravda* reporter asked why it was necessary to press the matter of Berlin at that time. Khrushchev replied that negotiations over Germany were at an impasse because the West refused to recognize realities—and he made it clear that the *de facto* existence of two Germanys was the particular reality he then had in mind — so Russia had no choice but to bring about an end to the occupation of Berlin. The uncertain line which the Russians have followed since suggests that the strong stand taken by the United States came as a surprise to Khrushchev. But we did take a strong stand, declaring last April that we regarded our position in Berlin as a *casus belli*; Khrushchev answered in kind only a few weeks before the May Summit meeting and, if Khrushchev's interests in Berlin had really been what he made them appear to be, that city would have brought us closer to war with the Soviet Union than we were in 1949.

There are lessons as well as risks in the Berlin question. The Russians insist on the termination of Western rights in Berlin. We insist on their continuance. So posed, there is no compromise, and again we are confronted with an issue in which the interests of the sides are irreconcilable. Russia has a geographical advantage in this dispute; hence the tactical insistence upon a time limit for the solution of the question. But there is no real urgency in the Berlin matter for the Soviet Union. The pressure is entirely artificial. The only real solution for the Berlin question lies in a solution to the German question, and it was for this purpose that the dispute was manufactured. All the compromises which we have so far proposed — the reduction of occupation forces to token strength, the control of propaganda and espionage, the recognition of an East German "presence" — are beside the point and useless. Khrushchev will drive us to the recognition of East Germany if he must risk war to do it.

These are bold tactics, but boldness is a side of the Russian Premier that must never be lost sight of. He is not only a daring politician; he has a positive appetite for the dramatic. Witness not only the Berlin dispute, but the performance at the Paris Summit meeting and, boldest of all, the attack upon Stalin at the 20th Party Congress. Khrushchev is par excellence the statesman of the "brink," and in tense times is a real danger if pushed too hard.

THE Berlin dispute, then, offers no hope for détente. What of the German question? In form, it is the classic type of dispute — a conflict over territory lying between the parties — which permits resolution through compromise. Is it so in substance as well? The answer becomes clear when the issues are examined.

At first glance, the Khrushchev position seems no different from that held by the Russians since the appearance of the two German regimes: unification through a federa-

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tion of the two existing Germanys. Nor has our own position changed materially. We insist upon unification only through free elections. The Russian position contemplates not only the "neutralization" of Germany, but the extension of Russian influence deep into Western Europe. The Western position contemplates not only the disappearance of the East German regime (based on a reading of German sentiment toward Russia) and a united Germany allied with the West, but the contraction of Russian influence at least to the borders of Poland. The essence of the German question is thus revealed to be a conflict over spheres of influence in Europe, and it is a conflict that reaches to the very heart of the cold war.

BUT THE Khrushchev proposals create a new setting for this dispute and offer, at last, the possibility of its resolution. Khrushchev has insisted that the cold war can be ended if both sides will accept existing realities. And this means acceptance by both parties of the division of Europe between East and West with which the Second World War ended, and which has since been consolidated by the years of the cold war. It means also a settlement along the line of the Iron Curtain — a recognition by the West of the existing system in Eastern Europe in return for a recognition by the Soviet Union of the restriction of that system to Eastern Europe. In a word, a recognition by both sides of what *is* the case in Europe, what has been the case in Europe for more than fifteen years, and what neither the Russians nor we will permit to change, even if we must go to war to preserve it. Our attitude in the Berlin question and Russia's actions in Poland and Hungary in 1956 amply demonstrate that determination. Russian willingness to accept this situation has already been shown by recognition of the West German government; the parallel course for us, pointing the way to the end of the German question and the Berlin question, lies in our recognition of the East German government, with all that that implies.

Is such a settlement in our interests? Although detailed arrangements will be very difficult to arrive at, an accommodation on the basis of an exact reciprocal regard for the strategic interests of both East and West can, in principle, be found. No other outstanding issue has this advantage. Moreover, a German settlement should include not only recognition of the East German government but a retreat from our Potsdam position and a recognition of the existing borders of Poland. In this way, the freedom of action of West Germany might be preserved.



More important, any relaxation of Western pressure upon the satellite system must necessarily result in a relaxation of Russian pressure on these states. Thus, a Western guarantee of Poland's present borders promises not only freedom of action for Germany but for Poland as well. The history of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 might have run an entirely different course had the future of Germany been settled at the time when Nagy held power. Indeed, recognition of the satellite system of Eastern Europe and "disengagement" through some reciprocal withdrawal of American and Russian forces stands as the *only* present path to possible freedom for these states: the heavier the Western military pressure on the Soviet Union, the heavier must the Russian yoke rest upon the states of Eastern Europe. Whatever kindness we can do for these countries can be done only through détente with the Soviet Union.

Of course, the Khrushchev proposals are also to the advantage of the Soviet Union (else they would never have been offered). But this very fact serves to answer Western skeptics who argue against a détente on the ground that the Russians cannot be trusted. Even the most implacable Russophobe must admit that the Russians can be trusted to uphold an agreement which serves their interests.

TWO further considerations arising out of the Khrushchev proposals must be touched on. His offer is for a European settlement only. China and the problems of the Far East are referred to no more than protocol would seem to require. This aspect of his proposal may be, in the final analysis, the most significant. It may well represent more important evidence of the divergence between the policies of the Soviet Union and those of Communist China than do the ideological disputes about which we have heard so much of late. It suggests the possibility that Khrushchev may be concerned to secure his western flank. And, if we insist on thinking in strategic terms, by the same token but with more immediate urgency, it permits us to secure our flank in the West. The earth is round, and it is we who are encircled in the cold war.

But Khrushchev's offer of a purely European settlement also suggests that he wishes to settle differences among the nuclear powers. These are — for the present — the European powers as well. Once again we find an interest in common with the Soviet Union. At the moment, détente with Russia is the only move that offers to us and to the world the possibility of restricting nuclear weapons to the present holders.

Finally, we must consider the kind of peaceful coexistence that Khrushchev proposes. He has been clear about this: by peaceful coexistence, he does not mean an end to conflict between the two systems. The "ide-

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ological struggle," as he puts it, is to continue. The battle between capitalism and communism for control of the world is to be carried on by all means short of violence between the two major representatives of these systems. War, as a revolutionary method, is to be abandoned; conversely, Khrushchev asks that war as a "counter-revolutionary" method be abandoned. This conception of peace has been rejected by the United States, although it may be the best that we can manage. And would acceptance be entirely against our interests? Our official doctrine does not require war to defeat communism. Dare we have so little confidence in the power of our system to prevail in non-violent conflict with theirs? In Europe, in any case, the risk is not very great. There are the most stable states in the world, and little is to be feared there from subversion.

Moreover, need we continue to think in the artificial antinomies of Communist analysis—either capitalism *or* communism? The post-war world has shown itself to be astonishingly rich in the creation of new social forms, and political lines have never been drawn according to the simple prescriptions of Marxism-Leninism. The future will be, as the past has been, a time of change and upheaval. We cannot avoid change, nor can we stifle it. But we can influence the direction and quality of change; Khrushchev's proposal confers upon us at least as much chance to influence change as it does upon him. Both of us have in common an interest to see that no effort to influence the course of the future will lead to war.

Debate Within Communism

by Paul Wohl

BEHIND half-drawn curtains, a great discussion is going on inside the Communist world. Because the chief protagonists are in Moscow and in Peking, the West would like to think that the debate is the herald of a great power rivalry which will one day split the Communist bloc. I do not believe this to be so. In my opinion, the discussions have nothing to do with the historical differences between Russia and China. The debate is party-political rather than power-political.

Actually, discussions between Moscow and Peking, not to speak of the rest of the Communist world, have never stopped. Discussion, not negotiation, is the normal way for Communists to straighten the differences among them which inevitably arise. In the past, however, leaks were rare; Communist debates were hidden behind closed doors.

This time, the discussions have spilled out into the press. There is no longer a Stalin whose unquestioned authority was recognized by all Communists. Both sides are speaking up at length, albeit in allusions. And it is this unaccustomed broad discussion which has led many Western observers to see the differences between Moscow and Peking as, perhaps, somewhat more serious than they really are.

One must remember that on most basic issues, the Soviet Union and China are in complete accord. Both claim allegiance to Marxism-Leninism; both invoke the platform of the twelve ruling Communist parties of November, 1957 (which defined the Communist world picture at the present stage); both adhere to the Bucharest Declaration of last June 27 (it was signed by all twelve parties), which states that foreign policy must be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and that increased watchfulness is needed in the present international situation.

Both sides are leaning over backwards to emphasize their essential unity. After *Red Flag* of Peking had stated repeatedly in its columns that "the nature of imperialism has not changed," *Red Star*, organ of the Soviet Armed Forces, noted on August 12 that "peace must not be prayed for or begged for from the imperialists; it can only be conquered by struggle."

Conversely, Chinese Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, on July 25, strongly rejected as "shameful slander" the charge that "China was warlike. . . . The Chinese nation loves peace and wishes to live peacefully with all nations in the world." Mr. Khrushchev himself could not have been more benign. On August 1, at a reception in the Swiss Embassy, both Mr. Yi and Premier Chou En-lai even tended an olive branch to the United States, as Mr. Khrushchev insists he has been doing for several years now.

YET THERE are differences. According to the Communists themselves, the differences concern tactics and propaganda, not principles. When both *Pravda* and the *People's Daily* of Peking assert that "there cannot be two views" with regard to war and peace, it means that there *are* two views — and that there shouldn't be.

But anyone familiar with the history of international communism knows that so long as party differences are limited to questions of expediency, tactics and interpretation, they merely lead to ideological double talk and are eventually resolved by practical readjustments which for a long time may remain imperceptible to the outside world.

Let us look now at the main points at issue between Moscow and Peking.

China's Chairman Mao and his supporters fear that the present playing up of the horrors of war by the Soviets is undermining the people's readiness to fight. To which Mr. Khrushchev's side has replied (in the August issue of the *World Marxist Review*) that "to say that war is inevitable in our time is to doom the peoples to waiting passively for the nuclear holocaust, to paralyze their will to fight for peace. . . ."

Chairman Mao and associates not only take issue with the anti-nuclear war line in Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest, but also intimate that the industrially more advanced comrades have become "soft." This

PAUL WOHL is the Christian Science Monitor's *special writer on Soviet affairs.*

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was the line of thought which led Chinese Communists, and after them the Albanian and Bulgarian parties, to decree that all party officials have to work manually during part of the year, and that army officers — this goes only for China — have to serve one month as ordinary privates.

The Soviets are aware of the softening effects of a modern industrial society. In a much ventilated article about state security in No. 11 of *Kommunist*, N. Mironov of the Central Committee's apparatus, complained that "our huge economic and cultural accomplishments engender in certain Soviet citizens lightheartedness and complacency."

A third main issue in the discussion inside communism is the appraisal of capitalism's strength. Mr. Khrushchev assumes that under conditions of peaceful coexistence the capitalist world must disintegrate economically, socially and politically through exposure to socialism and under the impact of a universal peace movement. Chairman Mao and his friends attribute greater strength and militancy to the capitalist system.

This difference in appraisal may explain, perhaps, the revolutionary aggressive attitude of Chinese agents in underdeveloped countries in contrast with the more "moderate" Soviet approach.

NONE of these differences is spelled out openly. Only occasionally does it become possible to sense the presence of conflict from a maze of ideological double talk.

It may be precisely because they are sensitive to Chinese criticism that the Soviet leaders seek to refute by deeds and bluster the accusation that they have become "soft," or are passively waiting for capitalism to crumble. Khrushchev's threat to bombard America with rockets, should Cuba be attacked, and his initial promises to Premier Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, point in this direction.

In the current discussion, both sides seek to make proselytes. Recent Soviet political and theoretical broadcasts in Mandarin, and Chinese party-political broadcasts in Russian, are gaining in scope.

A test is likely to come next month, when Premier Khrushchev visits North Korea. On October 1, Peking celebrates the eleventh anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. So far, the Chinese have not asked Mr. Khrushchev officially to include Peking on his tour.

This situation is made even more dramatic by the Soviet Premier's intention also to visit Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, on the occasion of his Korean trip. The transfer of former Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov from his Ambassadorial post in Ulan Bator to the International Atomic Agency in Vienna has removed a personal circumstance which might have complicated Khrushchev's Outer Mongolian visit.

It is difficult to believe that Chairman Mao will let Mr. Khrushchev make an official visit to the North Korean and to the Outer Mongolian capitals without asking that he also visit Peking.

In any case, the West is likely to learn more in the next two months about the content and scope of the discussion inside communism, a discussion which basically is as old as the first Communist state and has little to do with the historical rivalry between what *realpolitikers* still like to call the Russian and the Chinese empires.

FEATHERBEDDING vs. AUTOMATION.. *William Glazier*

THE WORK-RULES controversy is at the heart of the major labor-management disputes of recent years. In fact, employer drives to recapture lost authority by regaining control over work practices now overshadow wages as a bargaining issue. Last year almost two million workers were either on strike or in serious bargaining disputes over conditions of employment. In every instance employers were demanding elimination or changes in rules; the unions were fighting to keep the rules as they are.

The Steelworkers were on strike 116 days in a battle in which work rules were a key issue. At American Oil in Texas City, Texas, management won a 191-day strike over whether classifications could be crossed in job assignments. The strike that ran at Swift for fifty-two days and at Wilson for 109 days was primarily over management's demand to change work practices which allegedly interfered with new methods and new machines.

Some 13,000 men struck for four months at Pittsburgh Plate Glass over management's demand for a free hand in adjusting manning scales and work loads. In Portland, Oregon, the newspaper workers have been on strike since last November in a clash growing out of the introduction of new German stereotype machines. Major negotiations are now under way between 200,000 members of the five operating Brotherhoods and the railroads over demands to eliminate "obsolete" work rules. The same issue precipitated last week's strike on the Pennsylvania Railroad.

THERE is nothing mysterious about work rules. Anyone who has had a job in a factory or an office knows that the place operates under a set of rules which organizes the work of all the employees. The size of the crew on each job; the pace, scheduling and performance standards for each assignment; the application of seniority to promotions or layoffs; even the provisions for coffee and smoke breaks, clean-up time and

WILLIAM GLAZIER is an administrative assistant to national officers of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.

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other amenities — all these and more are laid down by work rules.

If there is no union, the employer decides what the employees must and must not do. If the employees are organized, the rules or the conditions on the job are jointly determined; and under these circumstances the rules also include something about what the employer must and must not do. Work rules, because they are tailored to local conditions and problems, are usually negotiated at the local level.

The negotiations over rules are invariably touchy. As soon as a union starts arguing about *how* the work shall be performed or *how many* men shall be employed, management has its back up. Union opinion on

such matters is resented and resisted as an intrusion upon management's authority; striking a bargain usually requires a good deal of persuasion. Generally speaking, management thinks that every rule imposed by the union entails unwarranted and unnecessary outlay.

But management is not alone these days in decrying union work rules as "featherbedding." Many objective observers think likewise. The common phrase—"union *make-work* rules" — expresses this feeling. Work rules are increasingly objected to on the grounds that they force inefficiencies upon industry, retain men who are paid for not working, throttle production and obstruct the introduction of labor-saving (and cost-reducing) machines and methods. Higher costs and prices are thus directly attributed to the so-called burden of rules which unions have negotiated. Even those who have steadfastly supported labor's right to organize and to bargain for decent wages, hours and conditions are openly critical of the unions on this score.

With living costs at the highest point in the nation's history and with the labor movement's reputation at an all-time low, it is not surprising that the charge that most, if not all, work rules are featherbedding is widely accepted. The Association of American Railroads has seized upon this to mount a national advertising campaign aimed at convincing badgered commuters that fares could be reduced and antiquated rolling stock replaced if "featherbedding" work rules, costing the lines "over $500 million a year," were eliminated. Every trade union in the land has been accused of insisting upon work rules that add to costs and fuel the fires of inflation.

The pessimistic economic outlook, deteriorating sales prospects, rising production costs, narrowing profit margins, and sharper foreign competition have all made improvement in man-hour productivity and reduction in labor costs a pressing management objective. The elimination of union work rules as much as possible and as soon as possible is urged as a major step toward this end. At the same time, the growing availability of technologically more advanced production methods has dramatically emphasized the substantial savings to be gained from changing over to automated and other labor-saving devices.

But every introduction of an automated process replacing men by machines requires that the whole structure of work rules be overhauled if the full potential of savings is to be made. Management's position is that a new production method or a new process automatically makes an old rule as obsolete as the old machine to which it was related.

Workers, on the other hand, hang on to work rules as a buttress against the essential insecurity of industrial employment. According to the AFL-CIO, 800,000 production workers have lost their jobs in the last five years because of the spread of automation. The unions hardest hit are in steel, autos, electrical equipment and other manufacturing. During these same few years the adult working population of the United States has grown by 7.6 million; employment, however, has gone up only 4 million, and an increasing number of those counted as employed are working short shifts and short weeks.

It is no exaggeration to assert that shop rules, and grievances over the interpretations of these rules, are a major concern of every worker every single day he is on the job. The primary business of the shop steward, the business agent and the local union official is enforcement of the working rules. To the average member, the union's record in rule making and rule enforcement is unquestionably the most important measure of union performance. That's why, incidentally, surveys revealing insignificant membership participation at union meetings can be so easily misinterpreted. Unions aren't built at meetings, they are built on the job.

With the exception of special rules dealing with health or safety, the purpose of most union rules is to *conserve* and to *spread* work opportunities. Therefore, if work rules are voluntarily changed to reduce labor costs and to introduce new machines in an orderly manner, alternative forms of job security must be found which workers will accept. It is doubtful that this can be accomplished through exclusive reliance upon collective bargaining.

CONDITIONS of work and structures of work rules vary enormously from industry to industry and from plant to plant. Longshoremen, for example, are employed in a floating warehouse — it is here today and gone tomorrow. They never know how much demand there will be for their labor next week or next month. As a result, longshore unions all over the world try to establish rules to meet the insecurity of their casual employment by getting as many men on each job for as long as possible. Limitation of sling loads, a widespread union practice in the industry, is a safety measure — and it also spreads the work. Gang sizes are strictly enforced. Disputes in the longshore industry have customarily been settled by action on the spot because to complete loading a

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ship with a grievance unsettled is to risk having the ship (where particular characteristics may have caused the dispute) leave port, not to return for weeks or months. Only after a system of minimum guaranteed employment and other security guarantees have been substituted for the "open hire," are longshoremen ready to bargain about relaxing their traditional and iron-tight work rules. Not surprisingly, adjusting established manning scales and load limits to new labor-saving methods of cargo handling presents an enormously complicated collective bargaining task.

The steel industry shows another kind of picture. During the hearings before the Board of Inquiry appointed by President Eisenhower in last year's steel strike, Board Chairman Taylor noted that the steel industry — publicly battling to make industry more efficient by eliminating obsolete work rules — already had unlimited authority to make unilateral changes in rules "which many other industries in this country would give a great deal to have." Taylor was referring to Section 2-B of the 1956 steel contract which conceded management the right to change or eliminate any local working condition upon a showing that the basis for the existence of the rule had been changed. Automation or other changes in production methods are not hindered in steel by rules on manning scales or work loads. In the most recent negotiations the industry demand, which ultimately became a major strike issue, was that the requirement laid down under 2-B should be eliminated and management should be free to change any rule simply upon a showing that doing so would save money. The union successfully resisted this proposal.

Despite its failure to amend the contract in this way, the steel industry nevertheless eliminated more than 10,000 production and maintenance jobs as the result of changes since the end of the strike seven months ago.

IT HAS long been maintained in academic circles that a stable and mature trade unionism is one which is focused upon controlling job opportunities and basic working conditions. "Job consciousness" and "job control" have been acclaimed as virtues of our brand of trade unionism. Clearly, when unions concentrate upon the interests of their own members at the place of work they are expressing their confidence in the capacity of the economic system to better the welfare of the working people. It would be foolish to contend that this confidence of the American unions has been misplaced in past years. However, by pursuing their job goals in this way, the unions rejected any broad program of social reorganization designed to improve the status and the economic conditions of the working people as a whole. In this the American labor movement is unique among the unions of the capitalist world.

This state of affairs has a real bearing on the work-rules controversy, especially under the conditions of accelerated technological change.

Even if a union manages to preserve jobs by maintaining the existing work rules, the labor-displacing impact of the machine has not been met but only obscured temporarily, and shifted to the backs of workers outside the union's ranks. For example, the young workers, who might have found industrial employment but for the machine, are the ones "displaced." Ironically, the more successful an individual union might be at job control, the more distressing the immediate effects of technological change might be for outsiders.

The proper aim is to develop a program which helps remove the fear of unemployment and reduced work opportunities while sharing the benefits of technological change directly with the workers whose lives are being disrupted. In a limited way some of these guarantees and benefits can be negotiated with individual employers — as some unions have already demonstrated.

But unless the labor movement is seriously prepared to look a considerable way ahead and to embrace a program of national planning to meet the erupting social and economic problems of automation, the successes at the plant level will be short-lived. The immediate outlook is that job opportunities will shrink for production workers already in the work force, and that one million more young workers will be seeking those jobs each year. In the decade 1947 to 1957, when the labor force increased by about ten million, there was hardly any increase in the number of production workers employed in manufacturing industries; in 1958 there was a sharp drop. During those same years output per man-hour in the private economy continued to grow at a rate of more than 3.5 per cent each year. And *that* was the trend before automation had seriously begun to accelerate both production and the displacement of men.

THIS discussion has been largely concerned with the hazards of technological change and the efforts of unions to mitigate these hazards through maintenance of work rules. The enormous social and economic benefits that could flow from the production revolution now getting under way are too well known to require detailing here. A richer and fuller life for all with more leisure are the promises of automation.

However, the benefits of automation — including greater leisure — will not be distributed automatically. Our present economy, after all, has a capacity to support a higher standard of living for most people than they now enjoy — a shorter work week and more leisure are possible right now and without the greater productivity that automation provides. But the current utilization of productive capacity and the distribution of the benefits of the economy are not geared to this end.

National economic planning, inspired by the union movement, will be necessary if the benefits of automation are to be distributed more equitably and the hazards kept down to manageable proportions. Not to recognize the necessity for this kind of approach — over and above collective bargaining and job control — will inevitably confirm Harold Laski's prediction that "So long as labor accepts the *status quo* in an evolving capitalism it accepts a diminishing role and influence on the American scene."

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BOOKS and the ARTS

The Fame of Mitchell Wilson

Bridget Ashbourne

WHEN I visited the Soviet Union last year, I talked to hundreds of people and particularly to students. These conversations usually gravitated to literature, since that was the subject in which I was most interested, and whenever it did I kept running into a mysterious name. On my first day in Leningrad, I was surrounded by a mob of eager, English-speaking Russians outside the Hotel Europa, and their opinions about what they were reading and had read echoed with the same phrase: "But best of all, we like your Mitchell Wilson."

Now, I am a fairly well-read young woman (Columbia M.A. in English Lit.) and several Wilsons came readily to mind, but Mitchell Wilson was not among them. Bluffing, I said: "Which of his books do you like best?" Back came the answer, again and again: *My Brother, My Enemy* of course! At this, I would nod wisely, and move quickly to another subject or another author. In my travel group were five New York City librarians. As soon as I could, I drew them apart and said: "Tell me about Mitchell Wilson." All I got in return was a blank stare. So I recovered somewhat from my embarrassment, if not my perplexity.

The story was the same in Moscow—"But best of all we like your Mitchell Wilson." I did find out in a conversation one night with a young schoolteacher from Yaroslave (who spoke with an American accent and explained it was because she had learned her English from a professor who had spent forty years in America and had come back to Russia ten years ago) that the best-seller was in English. When we tried to buy a copy of the book in the numerous book shops in Moscow, we were told with a gleeful smile: "Sorry, we are sold out."

There was no doubt that for the Russians Mitchell Wilson was classed along with Dickens, Dreiser, Cooper, Twain, Hemingway, Wordsworth, Whitman, Shelley, Byron, Keats (all extremely popular in the Soviet Union). We came to the conclusion among ourselves that he was probably not published in the United States; that he was undoubtedly a loyal party member, possibly even in prison under the Smith Act. The title of his book referred, obviously enough, to his fellow-Americans — a thoroughly un-American piece of work, we thought.

BACK in New York, I rushed to the nearest public library card index and there found that Mitchell Wilson was a man of many books. What had he written? Something called *Live with Lightning* (1949) — "A mighty novel of a man's struggle against today's temptations" (so said the jacket); something else called *The Lovers* (1954) — "A novel of Love and Passion on Martha's Vineyard in the Days of the Whaling Ships" (how subversive can one be on Martha's Vineyard?), and such various other titles as *Footsteps Behind Her, Stalk the Hunter, None So Blind, The Panic-Stricken, The Kimballs.* These titles did not strike me as particularly revolutionary. Well, perhaps *The Panic-Stricken, The Kimballs.* might possibly be so construed, but surely *The Kimballs* could only be a nice, respectable family saga.

I tried to buy a copy of *My Brother, My Enemy*, only to be told that it was out of print (published in 1952 by Little, Brown). Finally, with much calling around, I tracked down a copy on Fourth Avenue, as well as a copy of *The Lovers* (Literary Guild selection), the jacket of which informed me that Mr. Wilson has been writing short stories since he was eighteen, began his career as a physicist, but had given up physics for writing when this became profitable. I further learned that Mr. Wilson was born in New York City in 1913, that he was the third of four children, and that he had had a very happy childhood during which he used to make up stories and tell them to his brothers and sisters for as long as anyone would listen. His first publication had appeared when he was twenty-five. Since then, he had written a number of mysteries, including *The Panic-Stricken* (that clears up some of those titles). He had sold three of his books to the movies, one of which was produced under the title *Woman on the Beach.* All of this sounded not only pleasantly suc-

BRIDGET ASHBOURNE is employed in the play department of a large New York talent agency.

At a Country Hotel

(a young widow with two pretty children)

"I watched the seeds come down this afternoon
Over the lawn, the garden and the gravel drive.
Even on the pool, where the children sailed
The paper boats you made them—paper boats
Among the lilies, frightening the frogs—
Seeds fell and were sailing.

"I never get tired of watching how the seeds
Break from that high sea of silver and green
Branches to tumble and drift, to glide and spin
Down. It makes me think of falling asleep,
The way people say, I mean, 'falling' asleep,
As if it were really a falling.

"Summer is gone, and the fire is almost out...
How tired they were with playing! Will they dream
About their boats? Autumn is here, the night
Is rainy, with a cold wind; and still the seeds
Are falling, falling in darkness. Or else it is
The rain, that taps at the window."

It is late. He does not speak, will never speak.
She goes to the children sleeping, and he dreams
A kindly harbor, delicate with waves,
Where the tethered dories, rocking, rise and fall,
Until the high sail heightens, coming home
To landfalls of the lily and the ash.

HOWARD NEMEROV

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cessful, but thoroughly innocent and capitalistic.

The dedication in *My Brother, My Enemy* reads "To Helen," not "to Nikito" or "To Tanya" or "To Vassiliev," just Helen. The book has 372 pages and it begins in 1929.

The story deals with the two Mallory brothers (Davy and Ken), and their sister Margot. The three are orphans, very poor. They run away from their cruel uncle. The boys are both mechanically skilled. They open a garage and work their way through the local engineering college and spend almost all their spare waking moments working on their great, seemingly impossible invention . . . TELEVISION. The setting is Wickersham, a small community not far from Milwaukee. A rich and ruthless young man, Douglas Vollrath, comes to town to take over the local industrial plant. He meets and falls in love (against his will) with sister Margot, who is not at all of his class.

THE BOYS are passionately devoted to their sister, particularly Ken, whose feelings are unconsciously incestuous. They resent Vollrath's attentions to Margot. Ken is the hard one, the physical man of action, the dashing Don Juan who loves them and leaves them — all except his beautiful sister. Davy is the "good" one, quiet, mature, serious, pure, unspoiled. He falls in love with Vicky, a young girl who comes to stay with her grandfather, Norton Wallis, a blind old man who encourages the brothers to persist in their scientific probing. Vicky, however, is drawn to Ken, who for a while returns her passion. Davy suffers silently and works even harder at discovering television. The brothers, after many ups and downs (mostly downs), are successful at last in their experiment. They do discover television — along with a few other people in different parts of the world.

Vollrath, after resisting as long as possible, finally marries Margot, but she is killed in an airplane accident while flying back to Wickersham from New York. Vollrath, a Howard Hughes type who flies and manufactures airplanes, and is a Hollywood movie producer, is a cold, selfish man, totally unconcerned with people's fates once he has squeezed them dry. There is a temporary reconciliation between him and the brothers after their success, and he goes into partnership with them. Davy gets Vicky after all when she discovers she really and truly loves him and not Ken. And so the book ends with a death (Margot's), a marriage (Vicky and Davy), financial success (for all of them).

It's a long book, competently written, with great emphasis on technical details and scientific language and description. But what makes it so fantastically popular in the USSR? I believe that in a little room deep inside the vast Lenin Library in Moscow sits a man who reads every book ever published in the English language. In front of him are two piles — one tremendous, one tiny. The tremendous pile consists of books the reader considers unfit for his comrades to read. The tiny pile is composed of books he considers passable. These must either paint a damaging picture of the Western World (such as a best-selling booklet we encountered everywhere in Russia last year entitled *Unemployment in America*) or they must present some facet of American life which easily fits the Russian stereotype. *My Brother, My Enemy* falls neatly into both groups. The years of sacrifice endured by the brothers while they perfect their discovery, the obstacles they encounter in pursuing an engineering education without financial resources, the ruthlessness of the young industrialist, the love-hate theme among the siblings — all these spell Reactionary America to Russian readers. Mitchell Wilson set out, apparently, to produce a readable story, embellished with much plausible mechanical detail and some social observation, and giving an impression of 1929 America. He hoped that Americans would respond to it (they did not do so to any great extent), but I very much doubt that it ever occurred to him that Russians would find it fascinating or that the book would serve as propaganda.

WILSON spent several months in Russia last year and again this year. He was lionized wherever he went, and one wonders how keenly he feels the irony of the situation: he wrote a book for Americans that caused so little ripple that five professional librarians had never heard of it; but behind the Iron Curtain, caught up in the swell of the cold war, *My Brother, My Enemy* has become a tidal wave.

The Casebook Gambit

A CASEBOOK ON HENRY JAMES'S THE TURN OF THE SCREW. Edited by Gerald Willen. Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 325 pp. $3.95.

Terry Southern

WHEN THE pellet-and-pigeonhole syndrome of *Reader's Digest* invades the higher fields of inquiry, spritely resistance is in order.

The argument for the use of the "controlled research project" on the university level—of which this James *Casebook* is a first-rate example—is that the research going into student-theses has become embarrassingly sparse, often nonexistent, and almost always leading to conclusions so wildly disparate (or else so identical) that one might begin to doubt that any particular *truth* was being either taught or learned in the endeavor. With the "controlled research project" a single topic is designated (broadly) as the subject of a research-thesis for an entire class, and a single text is used for research—or rather a single *collection* of texts under one cover, texts selected to form a sort of *impartial balance* of representative pro and con conclusions of previous inquiry over the years. This approach is geared toward the lowest common denominator; behind it is the supposition that students who have heretofore written research-theses without cracking a book must now at least read the single assigned text. What it must also suppose is the possibility of comfortably asserting certain accepted values in an area where, in fact, none exist (i.e., everybody *knows* about Baudelaire, but no one *agrees* about him—or, on another level, everyone *does agree* about Baudelaire, therefore he is not proper material for research; whereas, given a subject-level on which disagreement is popular and the fact of severe disagreement has no dangerous implications, *then* treatment in a thesis lends itself to the fine-line evaluation necessary for the prestige of specialized academics, but without involving any shock hazards). The casebook program is, in short, a torturous self-contradiction—a groping for some sign of "unifying values" and a fairly substantial proof, by virtue of its own format, that none obtain.

This highly organized line of genteel inquiry had its debut, as far as can be determined, at the University of Ohio, in 1956, presumably under the auspices of the History Department, with *The Incident at Harper's Ferry,* an anthology of pros and cons concerning that touchy episode. Subsequent casebooks included such equally explosive topics as *The*

TERRY SOUTHERN'S novels are The Magic Christian *(Random House) and* Flash and Filigree *(Coward-McCann).*

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Third Day at Gettysburg: Pickett's Charge, along with several others too innocuous to recall. The effrontery, however, of so dealing with the "quality lit" game seems to be a fairly recent business, but to date has managed to dispose of both Dylan Thomas and Ezra Pound, quite inexpensively ($1.95). The present volume is somewhat more expensive, though understandably so as it contains the complete text of the work in question (*The Turn of the Screw*) in addition to its main attraction, the pros and cons by various hands (Edmund Wilson, Allan Tate, Katherine Anne Porter and, among others, Henry James himself) as to whether or not the work is "more than a mere ghost story." James's own account ("merely a ghost story," "jolly good fun and all that") is, of course, a lot of hokum. The real questions are: Were the man and the woman whom the children saw on the edge of the lake representations of James's dual nature? Of the dual nature of Man? Was the narrator (was the narrator James?) secretly in love with his charwoman? His nanny? His mommy? Was the woman on the edge of the lake (Man? James's mommy?) actually meant to represent the narcissistic aspect of James's troublesome sibling? Was H. G. Wells somehow involved? (Small wonder they are called casebooks.")

THIS obsession for trivial pigeonholing and the insistence on agreement about it is what has undone our education on the university level; this, along with compulsory attendance, compulsory examinations, fraternities, or, in all, a militant effort toward nothing more than a childlike togetherness (the big happy family, but worse still, rallied around the idiot instead of the father) has, in fact, reduced it to the level merely of a "system"—big, cheap and meaningless.

Our commitment to the democratic process right up through the area of higher education, as excellent a thing as it may be in theory, becomes a liability when standards begin to decline rather than to rise. We have allowed our universities, with their boards of trustees and money problems, to get into the position of the television show, concerned with its rating rather than its quality. The university that loses students is like the show that loses listeners: the big money, or the trustees who can raise it, move elsewhere, and the show folds. And it is precisely *that* sort of problem the casebook people should address themselves to, instead of staging inane Freudian hen-parties under the guise of scholarship.

Three After Marx

KARL MARX: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy. Edited by T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel. Watts & Co. London. 268 pp. 21s.

CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY. By Ralf Dahrendorf. Stanford University Press. 336 pp. $6.50.

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY: The Selected Papers of Bernard J. Stern. Citadel Press. 433 pp. $5.

Edwin M. Schur

PROFESSOR Bottomore, lecturer in sociology at the London School of Economics, and Dr. Rubel of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, have prepared a book which will be of interest both to students of Marxist thought and to students of sociology. Most of the passages have been newly translated (by Dr. Bottomore), and some are here given in English for the first time.

Was Marx a sociologist? Bottomore and Rubel argue that he was at least partly one. They insist that the philosophical aspects of Marx's work have been overstressed, that the central concern of Marx was with the social causes of various phenomena. (Included in these selections is Marx's "Enquête Ouvrière" — the 101-item questionnaire he distributed to workers in France in order to discover actual working and living conditions.) Of course, Marx was also a political activist; "His aim was to transform speculative philosophy into a critical social theory which would be of use to men overcome by misery." But quite apart from its political usefulness, the Marxist analysis did much to stimulate the systematic study of social change, of social classes and of various systems of thought (including religion). As Bottomore and Rubel indicate, much of the most important work in the social sciences has stemmed from a continuing debate over issues raised by Marx. It is useful to remember this at a time when Marxism remains a dirty word in certain sociological circles.

PROFESSOR Dahrendorf, of the University of Hamburg, tries to develop (taking Marx as a starting point) an inclusive theory of class and class conflict. He insists that all real classes are conflict groups, and that a clear distinction should be drawn between class analysis and the study of social stratification. This is an important point because much American work in this area has concentrated on social ranking, status-seeking and the like. Dahrendorf contends that such factors have nothing to do with class. Whereas the study of social strata (levels in a social hierarchy) helps to explain the situations and actions of individuals, only the study of classes (conflict groups) can explain the major changes in society. Power relations, not prestige differences, determine social change.

Much sociological work has suffered from the static emphasis of what Dahrendorf terms the "integration theory of society." This theory (typified by the writings of Talcott Parsons) assumes that the natural state of society is consensus, stability, equilibrium. Conflict then tends to be considered unnatural — or, as it is often put, deviant. The trouble with the integration model (by itself) quite simply is that it fails to account for the prevalence of social conflict. For this reason Dahrendorf rightly states that we must at least supplement it with a model that sees conflict and change not as "deviant," but rather as inevitable (and often desirable) built-in aspects of any society.

Dahrendorf subjects Marx's approach to social class (which clearly is in this conflict tradition) to a meticulous and illuminating analysis. He also surveys the class theories of numerous more recent writers (including several important theorists — Fritz Croner, Karl Renner and Theodor Geiger — whose work is little known in the United States). His conclusion is that the orthodox Marxist theory of class is inadequate, because we are no longer faced with "capitalist" societies divided into "two great hostile camps." Major changes since Marx include the separation of ownership and control in industry, the diversification of skills which has split the working class, the rise of a new middle class, increased social mobility and the "institutionalization of class conflict" — its acceptance and social regulation (as in collective bargaining and related techniques). Dahrendorf concludes that relations of authority determine class formation and class conflict, and that control over the means of production is but one special case of authority.

This approach certainly helps, for example, to explain the development of "classes" in Socialist societies (as described by Djilas and others). But the theory seems to have only limited applicability to the current situation in the United States. How "post-capitalist"

EDWIN M. SCHUR teaches sociology at Wellesley College.

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is a society in which big business still dominates the inner circle of policy making, a society which resists providing health insurance even for the aged? Is it realistic to write of "the institutional isolation of industry" when retired generals are sought for top management posts and when "independent" regulatory agencies are closely linked with the industrialists they are supposed to regulate?

IF Professor Dahrendorf's book constitutes an intensive exercise in social theory-building, *Historical Sociology* represents the application of a basically Marxian point of view to a wide range of empirical and theoretical problems. Dr. Stern, who taught at Columbia University and the New School for Social Research, was also an assistant editor of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences and a founder and editor of the scholarly journal *Science and Society*. The essays in this memorial volume cover diverse topics — aspects of historical materialism, science and war production, Engels on the family, a note on Comte, genetics and Lysenko, and the need for national health legislation. As the editors note, the variety of subject matter in no way implies that Stern's work is superficial or mere "popularization." On the contrary, he brings to bear on each topic a broad knowledge, a sharp analytic skill and an all too rare recognition of the crucial issues.

Ultra-professionalists probably will object to the fact that these essays are not written from a viewpoint of utter scientific detachment, of so-called "ethical neutrality." Indeed Dr. Stern makes quite explicit his adherence to and promotion of the values of human decency and of democratic socialism. Yet nowhere do his values masquerade as facts, nor does his avowal of such values prevent him from scrupulously examining the facts.

The book is aptly titled because the major unifying theme of the entire work is social change. Do our social institutions fit the conditions of a rapidly changing world? Stern presents much evidence to support his claim that capitalism frustrates technological advance — by discouragement of pure research and of worker inventiveness, by the shelving and suppression of patents, and by promoting a general unwillingness to innovate. Also instructive is his discussion of how vested interests have impeded change in the fields of public health and medicine. He cites case after case in the history of medical science where resistance to progress was not just psychological, but institutional as well. Similarly, of the historic opposition of landlords to public health measures, Stern states that "the most difficult task of the public health officer has been to combat this individualism that puts rent and profits above human welfare." True in England in the 1850s, true in New York in the 1960s!

STERN'S historical approach challenges institutional arrangements which may be accepted unquestioningly by those who adopt an "integration" approach to social life. There is the danger, for example, that sociologists may accept the prevailing pattern of family life as given, focusing only on "adjusting" families to such a pattern. In two essays on the family, Stern refuses to accept such a narrow focus. What does the history of the family tell us about the interrelations of the family and other social institutions? Should women be confined to childbearing and domestic work? What form of family life best meets the needs of modern democratic society? These are the vital issues, notwithstanding that proposed changes may endanger the "stability" of the traditional family scheme.

Despite his political commitment, Stern is not dogmatic. Just as Dahrendorf discards parts of Marx's class theory, Stern questions Lysenko and recognizes that Engels' family theory was based partly on inadequate anthropological data. These books should help to show that "Marxist scholarship" need not be a contradiction in terms, that in fact it has useful insights to offer to social science today.

Inside the Hospital

THE CULTURE OF THE STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL. By H. Warren Dunham and S. Kirson Weinberg. Wayne State University Press. 308 pp. $5.

Max Pepper

THOUGH stoutly asserting the "pure objectivity" of most present-day social scientists, Professor Dunham and Weinberg do in fact present the inexorable realities of state hospital life with a welcome breath of indignant outrage. *The Culture of the State Mental Hospital* is an absorbing account by these social scientists of a study made of a large state mental hospital which they describe as fairly representative of those in the Midwest. Techniques of social psychology were employed in an attempt to get "inside" the hospital by way of the authors' "participant observation" in the day-to-day lives of patients and staff. The study was made in 1946, and the present volume is the first complete publication of the results.

Within the past decade, a number of important studies have been done and published by various social scientists who viewed the mental hospital, both public and private, as a social system with structures both formal and informal, that could be understood in the context of social theory. The authors maintain that theirs was the first study of the social structure of a mental hospital and believe that the publication of the manuscript at this time has "historical interest" (perhaps an eloquent comment by sociologists on the sociology of sociologists, or upmanship in the academic publishing race).

At any rate, the account is for the most part readable and revealing, though as might be inferred from the above, it states nothing that has not been already published by others. The text presents a rich variety of excerpts from inter-

MAX PEPPER, M.D., teaches in the department of psychiatry at the Yale Medical School and in the department of sociology at Yale University.

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views the authors held with both patients and employees, to illustrate their main findings. Indeed, the heavy reliance on anecdotal materials makes for a rather journalistic style of reporting, with a muckraking tinge, despite the insistence on devotion to scientific methods. There are gross errors of commissions and omissions in the text, many due to poor editing, it would seem. The authors state: "Of all the mentally ill in our society, 97.6 per cent (as of 1947) are being cared for and treated in state hospitals." Clearly, the word "hospitalized" must be inserted before "mentally ill," yet the authors consistently make this error.

DESPITE all this, the account of hospital culture is cogent, and it pinpoints specific conflicts in structure, practices and traditions which inevitably have hindered the effective treatment and care of patients. The portrayal is realistic and dismal, and unfortunately is still all too timely. With all the recent innovations in psychiatric practice — the inception of home-care programs, the movement toward open wards in mental hospitals, psychiatric units in community-based general hospitals, the intensification of efforts toward public mental health education and the training of ever-increasing numbers of professionals in the mental health fields— the shame of our public mental hospitals stubbornly persists. The authors searingly illuminate some of the factors that make this so. Thus, the punitive rather than therapeutic attitudes and actions of staff toward patients exhibiting deviant or disturbed behavior are reinforced and promoted by the "informal structure" of the institution. ("Informal structure" is a euphemism social scientists employ to describe the actual, as opposed to the prescribed, behavior emerging in the operation of an institution.) The emergence of the "chronic" and "institutional" types is clearly shown to be at least as much related to the actual culture and social structure of the institutional setting as to the psychological disturbance in the patient. The nature of the work performed by patients in the hospital is devastatingly exposed as a function of the needs of the institution, and not of the individual patient. The authors do not detail what is to be done, but by asserting the just but often neglected role and responsibility of sociologists as social critics, they help point the way toward a truly preventive and social psychiatry.

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LETTER from DUBLIN

Robert S. Ryf

NO OBSERVER of the Irish scene will be surprised to learn that the Drama Festival, due to open in Dublin the middle of this month, has already served up a prologue of polemics in the form of an exchange of caustic letters in *The Irish Times*. It reopens that traditional Irish sore — censorship.

Sean O'Casey raised the curtain by lambasting the Archbishop of Dublin for announcing that no votive Mass would open the Festival if a play by Joyce or O'Casey were scheduled. Recounting some of Joyce's and his own past difficulties with Irish censors, official and unofficial, O'Casey observed acidly that freedom of expression fared little better in Dublin than in Moscow.

O'Casey was promptly engaged in battle two days later by Monk Gibbon, whose memoir of Yeats was pummeled by Frank O'Connor in *The Nation* of February 23. Gibbon called the cause of freedom a "fashionable shibboleth," and then promptly defended the Archbishop's freedom not to perform the Mass.

Calling Joyce Ireland's "Golden Calf," Gibbon accused "fanatical adherents" of imposing the author of *Ulysses* "on an unwilling world," by "using all the formidable weapons of literary snobbery." Gibbon then gave the back of his hand to the celebrated legal decision of Judge Woolsey in 1933 which allowed the publication of *Ulysses* in the United States, by saying that it "reads like an oration from some liberal-minded chairman to a woman's club." So if Ireland hasn't joined the celebrations around the Golden Calf, concluded Gibbon ("Would Dante have joined in them?"), it may be because of Joyce's "debilitating nihilism."

But if Gibbon intended to sidetrack the problem of free expression, an article in the same newspaper defeated the attempt by reporting that 487 books were banned in Dublin last year. It would appear from these figures that O'Casey is not attacking straw men, but live ones, with torches in their hands.

IT IS difficult to estimate what impact this sort of controversy about Joyce has upon the citizens of Dublin. It's a curious situation. *A Portrait of the Artist* and *Dubliners* are displayed in the bookshops, but not *Ulysses* or *Finnegans Wake*. Yet books about Joyce seem to be unrestricted — some of them containing quotations from the passages which supposedly led to the

ROBERT S. RYF, who is on the faculty of Occidental College, Los Angeles, is spending this year studying and writing in England.

Nature Poem

There's so much green
In what I've seen
I have to scream
Ahhhhhhhhhhh

It's turned to red
My aching head
I'll go to bed
Ohhhhhhhhh

And now there's white
Both day and night
A ghostly fright
Eeeeeeeee

The color's dun
There's not much sun
I'll shoot myself with a hunting gun
Boooooooom

NICHOLAS BIEL

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censoring of his works in the first place.

The government does acknowledge him as one of their own by listing his birthplace in the Official Guide to Dublin, but the reference is very terse, and last on the list. Aside from this, one senses a good bit of indifference around the town. When I mentioned to an Irish tour guide that I was interested in Joyce's writings and had walked to 7 Eccles Street that afternoon, he said, "Ah yes, the place where Joyce was born."

"No," I pointed out, "it's the address he gave Leopold and Molly Bloom in *Ulysses*."

"To be sure," he replied blandly, "to be sure."

Commercially, however, there seems to be some advantage to acknowledging and even claiming Joyce. One of the two most fashionable pubs in town, Davy Byrnes's is advertised as "the pub in *Ulysses*." Across the street, the venerable The Bailey countered recently with an exhibit of photographs of the Dublin of Joyce's day. Joyce himself does not appear in the pictures, but what they prove, beyond any doubt, is that, aside from fashions in clothes, the city has changed hardly at all.

And that, I think, is the point. Neither public censorship nor private apathy can change the fact that Joyce's Dublin still stands today, palpable and redolent of him. For example, as I was attempting to reconstruct Bloom's journey through the city in *Ulysses*, a blind beggar came tapping along the sidewalk, much as in the book. As I was discoursing on the beauties of the city, a horse-drawn wagon of Guinness kegs rumbled past, drowning me out—much as Stephen's discourse on aesthetics in *A Portrait of the Artist* is drowned out. And the house at 7 Eccles Street appears unchanged, even though the one next door now sports a TV antenna.

So the censors are ultimately doomed to defeat by the city Joyce immortalized. For you can't censor a city out of existence. Not Dublin, anyway.

ART

Fairfield Porter

THE AUDIENCE for all the arts is growing. Probably not since the time when the populations of cities were organized into craftsmen's guilds, almost all of which participated in artistic production, have people been so open to art or wished so to experience it. And experience is the only way to know it. Art can be known best in its own terms, artistically. The experience of art is inhibited if it is considered as something to be "understood," something, like juvenile delinquency, that resists social control, but whose prevalence requires a sympathetic and tolerant attitude in order that society or individuals may manipulate it for social benefit or private ends. The worst and most mistaken way of manipulating art is to use it for malicious propaganda; a much less bad way is to understand it as part of a disinterested study of all society, without emotional involvement—as though emotion were an obstacle in the pursuit of truth. In this case, disinterest inhibits the experience. But between these extremes there are other common ways of regarding art that are inhibiting. One of those is to consider art as a natural phenomenon for scientific investigation; another is to think that it is a substitute for science, religion or philosophy in the revelation of profundities. It is still fashionable to explain Impressionism as an illustration of the theory of the physical nature of light. When I was at Harvard, Professor Sachs invited a physicist from M.I.T. to explain the nature of Impressionism to his class on the history of French painting. This man talked to us as one talks to very small children, but he patronized the Impressionist painters even more than he did us. He was not interesting because he told us nothing that we did not know, and this seemed all that he knew. He assumed that Impressionism was valuable to consider for its compatibility with science.

The sociological or historical approaches are more common. The first makes art as good as its purposes: if art contributes to the progressive liberation of the poor and exploited it is good; if it darkens people's minds with superstition, it is bad. The historical approach is usually relativist: art presents an image of society at any given time. If this does not inhibit experience, it is at least unnecessary. It is best when it works as an art parallel to the art it attempts to illuminate. Both of these pseudo-scientific points of view are inhibiting if they induce new prejudices to take the place of the ones they super-

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sede. We think of Victorian prejudices as narrowly moralistic; but sociology may impose, instead of a prejudice for the suppression of sensuality, one in favor of the morality of material fact; or scientific determinism instead of religious determinism; impersonality instead of emotion. The question is not about the truth of any of these opinions or ideas; the question is about the experience of art. And a prejudice in favor of the relativity of values can inhibit by making one disregard one's own feelings, and consequently directing the experience in advance.

The large audiences for art make it less necessary than ever to apologize for art. People are open to it. But art is presented through the efforts of professionals, and these curators, dealers, printers, restorers and critics present art as something to be understood, as something that requires special competence to perceive. That also leads to the consideration of art in terms other than its own. The experience of art can be inhibited by the way in which it is hung, reproduced, restored and criticized.

Of course it is hard to see paintings and sculpture if there are too many examples in too small a space, but that isn't the whole problem. It is also inhibiting if they are presented in too precious a way, apart from ordinary life. Some years ago the Museum of Modern Art spotlighted every painting of an exhibition of old masters in an unearthly fashion that gave an illusion that the paintings had no material surface, that they were just images of light, made of colors that had not existed before this particular exhibition. It was like looking at sacred objects, or the crown jewels.

In order to show its need for more space, the Modern has recently hung its collection in a very crowded fashion. But the intelligent, tasteful and refreshingly irreverent hanging partly defeats its purpose by animating the works historically.

ANOTHER example is the lighting in the Guggenheim Museum, which makes each painting insubstantial and visionary. It makes art seem to pretend to be something more than it is, phony and tiresome. This hanging was the unfortunate result of the challenge presented by Frank Lloyd Wright's building. Wright seemed to consider his buildings in somewhat the way that a seventeenth-century Massachusetts divine considered his sermons: disdainful, spare and relentless. This museum is the last battle of Wright's war against art, which was a threat to his own ambition. Either you cannot see the paintings from far enough away, or if you can, they are cut off, from the top and/or the bottom, like yard goods. The snail-shell floor scheme limits the meaning of the paintings to their place in the sequence. People go in vast crowds to see Wright's fun house, but not the paintings, which could have been seen better in their previous surroundings. His house is fun because there is nothing in an architectural way to compare it with in a city without architectural tradition, but only an engineering one. As a museum, it very effectively expresses its architect's contempt for art.

THE BEST museum presentation I know of in this country is at the Cloisters, housing most of the Metropolitan's medieval collection. It is a delight to millions. Also excellent is the new wing at the Metropolitan, with a room featuring a window on the best view to the south. And the Worcester Museum, ever since Francis Taylor's first term as director, has bought and displayed art for its intrinsic merit instead of for a name value. In May and June it exhibited paintings by Sir Thomas Lawrence, who is distinguished among all English artists as the most un-English, as the one who more than any of his countrymen dared to consider art quite unaffectedly on its own terms, for its own sake. Not only are no exhibitions hung with greater artistry than those of the Tanager Gallery in New York, but the large window makes each exhibition a natural extension of the life of Tenth Street. To present art as an actual part of life is quite a different matter from "understanding" it as part of society.

Because art restorers have much science, they are often tempted to take a scientific attitude toward the object being preserved or restored, as though the "immortality" of art properly removed it from time. This puts into art a rigidity that does not belong there. And in their rationalizations of what they do, the restorers appeal to their knowledge against experience, which is a way of disregarding art in favor of craft. In answering criticism they seem to agree in reverse with the person who says, "I don't know anything about art, but I know what I like." The restorer says in effect, "I know a great deal about art and, in the face of that knowledge, what anyone likes is of little importance." Here, as so often, scientific principle has become anti-empirical and authoritarian. It does not take into account that art, whether realist or abstract, like the nature and experience of an individual, is not valuable so much for the general principles it embodies, as for its unprecedentedness.

IN THIS country, certainly, when art is reproduced mechanically even by transplanted European technicians, it is done scientifically, and the spirit of the original is almost invariably debased. I have seen the phases that the reproduction of a painting goes through. In the effort to get accuracy, liveliness gradually vanishes. It should be remembered that reproduction cannot be exact, for that would contradict the nature of art as always unique. A reproduction can be itself beautiful, art itself, parallel but not equal to something else.

Historical placement, even such as insists on the uniqueness of art, will not contribute to the vitality of one's pleasure. Experience comes first, ahead of the morality of either the old or the new. To consider a work as good as, but no better than, the precedence of its appearance, is to be too coarse about individuality. Are children of no value if they resemble their parents closely? To ask the meaning of art, is like asking the meaning of life: experience comes before a measurement against a value system. And the question whether art has any meaning, like the same question about life, may not be answerable at all. It can be answered by each person for himself, and it is doubtful how well this answer can be communicated. What counts is personal experience, and therefore, what the critic can do, in fact all he can do, is to describe his experience as sensitively as possible.

A Visit to a Friend in a Mental Hospital

The imitation was very good,
Perfect, in fact, except for the eyes,
But still, I left as soon as I could.

The beauty that the face of wood
Possessed was hardly minimized.
The imitation was very good.

I told myself I understood
At times a person partly dies,
But still, I left as soon as I could.

I talked to her as I thought I should
Trying to keep from telling lies;
The imitation was very good.

The familiar-looking stranger stood
To watch me go. Once she was wise,
But still I left as soon as I could.

I buttoned my raincoat, tightened
my hood,
Denying that terror multiplies.
The imitation was very good,
But still, I left as soon as I could.

RUTH SOTER

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Crossword Puzzle No. 880

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Tennyson's order to horn in on falling splendor? (4, 5, 4)
10 It does a juggling act for fawns. (7)
11 Sound heard by the cowboy circle where things are tied up? (7)
12 The philosophy of "Do Not Disturb" signs is an added factor in sound reduction. (9)
13 Wet blankets? (Or just what a new shirt does in drying?) (5)
14 What the waitress, the hireling, and the priest all might take. (5)
16 United an organization, as too many 13 might do. (8)
19 The coffee house elegy might have been on one. (8)
20 Eating establishments always provide a good way to take food. (6)
22 In France I take a short holiday, ending up in China. (5)
23 Where Magellan evidently sensed the oversize type in print. (9)
25 A railroad might be a common example. (7)
26 What is sometimes turned over when new and allowed to carry a message? (7)
27 See 8 down

DOWN:

2 Exception is frequently taken to its being last. (5)
3 Was it caused by true Revolutionary spirit? (6, 9)
4 To push for the final outcome? (6)
5 The sort of balm that is placed on rough skin might at one time have been called silly. (8)
6 Swift creatures, despite their size. (15)
7 You shouldn't copy when you do. (9)
8 and 27 Could this be said of duty in part of Iberia? (3, 2, 3, 7, 6)
9 The infant was the first of seven. (4)
15 Drape that might prove dangerous. (9)
17 At recent reading, might be enjoyed during play. (8)
18 Key accompanists helped watch o'er them. (8)
21 This gives the right slant to your reading. (6)
22 Just the man to lift the bumper high! (4)
24 In which to win, you had to lose. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 879

ACROSS: 6 Bays; 10 Viaduct; 11 and 1 across Theater in the round; 12 Lion; 13 Discretion; 15 Elevate; 16 Serpent; 17 Accepts; 20 Capably; 22 Immaterial; 23 Esau; 25 Idiotic; 26 Proverb; 27 Yoga; 28 Goodfellow. DOWN: 1 Invulnerability; 3 Etui; 4 Outside; 5 Notices; 7 Astride; 9 Telegraph; 14 Palpitate; 18 Camping; 19 Sirocco; 20 Chapped; 21 Boswell; 24, 2 and 8 More than one string to your bow.

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September 1, 1960

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Let me express here that I believe your magazine is the most enlightened publication in America. During the U-2 and Summit period, yours was the only publication that was saying what I had to say. Your articles on the "peace" issue — the only issue that really counts — were courageous and deserve the highest praise. Keep it up!

(Signed) A. Stephen Boyan, Jr.

South Boston, Mass.

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